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Abstract
This paper lies at the convergence of the portfolio optimization literature and the equity
research industry. I attempt to quantify the benefit provided to an investor by equity analysts
from an asset allocation perspective, and hypothesize that no significant benefit exists because of
the incentive misalignments facing analysts as well as the inherent difficulty of valuing stocks.
Using a Bayesian regression framework with prior beliefs for alpha generated based on equity
analysts’ recommendations, I find no significant difference in out-of-sample performance
between portfolios which take analyst recommendations into account and portfolios which do
not.
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Introduction
On March 2, 2017, shares of Snap Inc. (SNAP) began trading publicly on the New York
Stock Exchange for $17 a share. At a roughly $33 billion implied equity valuation, the IPO
placed the newly public SNAP on the level of well-known giants like Target and Marriott.
Morgan Stanley, the leading investment bank on the transaction, waited until March 27 to issue
its buy rating and corresponding $28 price target, implying more than 60% upside from the IPO
price. Just a day later, on March 28, the bank issued a second note which contained, at the
bottom of the second page, the following disclaimer:
We have corrected a tax calculation error in our model that overstated adjusted EBITDA
in 2021-2025. We have updated the text and charts in the following note to reflect our
estimate changes. Note that our revenue forecast and fundamental top-line drivers
(DAUs, ad load, etc.) remain unchanged.
The overstatement of adjusted EBITDA mentioned here amounted to a decrease in Snap’s
forecasted free cash flow of over $900 million per year, on average – a 35% decrease. And yet,
Morgan Stanley’s second note went on to reiterate the bank’s $28 price target. By concurrently
lowering the cost of capital used in the model from 9.7% to 8%, the bank ended up almost
exactly offsetting the overstatement of EBITDA. This change placed Morgan Stanley’s cost of
capital well below the estimates of other banks, which used costs of capital of anywhere between
11% and 16%.1
At best, the research team responsible for constructing this model clearly made two
significant errors – by the note’s own admission. At worst, “it almost feels like they’re backing
into the numbers,” according to Charles Lee, professor at Stanford Graduate School of Business.2
Either way, the correction calls into question the accuracy and reliability of analyst price targets

1
2

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/morgan-stanley-made-error-analyzing-195438221.html.
Ibid.
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in general. While the majority of the extant literature on this subject analyzes analyst rating
changes as a near-term cause for returns, it does not address the realized accuracy of the
analysts’ recommendations, or comment on whether they add value to an investor seeking to
generate strong risk-adjusted returns. This paper attempts to answer that question.
I combine a Bayesian regression framework, using analyst recommendation data to create
prior beliefs for 12-month forward alpha, with an asset allocation optimization process based on
quadratic mean-variance investor utility. By constructing six sets of model specifications, each
under different assumptions about the return-generating processes of the included stocks, I
directly compare the 12-month returns of portfolios that incorporate analyst recommendations
into the Bayesian framework to the returns on portfolios that are agnostic to these
recommendations. In light of the increased difficulty of generating alpha in the market due to
competition, increased low-cost access to information, as well as the frequent errors and
incentive misalignments that plague equity analysts, I hypothesize that portfolios based on
analyst recommendations will not outperform portfolios that are not. I first test this hypothesis
with a preliminary analysis created by splitting all analyst-rated stocks from a given year into
quintiles based on their mean recommendation. This preliminary method shows no statistically
significant or economically important difference between the top and bottom quintiles, failing to
reject the hypothesis. The full analysis supports the hypothesis as well – across three benchmark
models and three analyst-based models, I do not find statistically significant evidence that any of
the analyst-based portfolios outperform the benchmark portfolios.
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Literature Review
This paper lies at the intersection of the equity research industry and the classic asset
allocation problem. As such, this review begins with an overview of the equity research industry
and its current challenges. I then present the history of the asset allocation problem, focusing on
both the underlying economic theory and the implementation of a utility-maximizing algorithm
which performs well both in and out of sample.
For as long as there has been publicly traded equity, there has been equity research.
While the nature of the work required to conduct this research has changed over time, the
economic niche filled by the equity research industry has stayed largely consistent. Equity
analysts, often affiliated with large financial institutions, devote significant resources to valuing
publicly traded stocks. By conducting due diligence calls, attending conferences, creating
complex models, collecting proprietary data, and more, analysts issue price targets for any
number of stocks. These targets are subject to revision at any time, depending on countless
factors. The targets, and the accompanying equity research reports, are subsequently used by
institutional investors, asset managers, and even some individuals to make investment decisions.
The obvious assumption made when an investor integrates one or more equity analysts’
conclusions into their decisions is that the analyst has superior analytical tools or information and
is therefore able to arrive at a more reliable price target for a given stock. However, as
information has become more readily available – annual SEC filings are accessible online, data
sources like Bloomberg or Capital IQ are purchased by practically all professional investors, and
quarterly earnings calls are transcribed and uploaded to the Internet – investors have become
more able to conduct much of this analysis themselves. The question this paper attempts to
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answer is, in light of these varying complicating factors, to what extent do equity analysts still
hold an edge over the rest of the market?
Compounding the increased accessibility of information to unaffiliated investors is the
idea that equity analysts may not themselves be objective information aggregators. As an
example, Green, Hand, and Zhang (2016) evaluated 120 DCF models produced by sell-side
analysts from 2012 and 2013. The authors discovered that analysts made a median of three
theory-related or execution errors (e.g. using the wrong risk-free rate) and four questionable
economic judgments (e.g. using a market risk premium in excess of 9%) per model. Furthermore,
correcting these errors altered price targets by between -2% and 14% per error. Given the median
of a combined seven errors per model, the potential for a price target that differs significantly
from true value is high. These errors add to, and interact with, the numerous other more
subjective assumptions that analysts must make in constructing a model – growing or shrinking
margins, revenue growth figures, future capital structure, and more. Green, Hand, and Zhang
supplemented their work with interviews with analysts, and came to the following conclusion:
Based on face-to-face interviews with analysts and those who oversee them, we conclude
that analysts‘ DCF modeling behavior is semi-sophisticated in the sense that analysts
genuinely make mistakes regarding certain aspects of correctly valuing equity but also
respond rationally to the incentives they face, particularly the reality that they are not
directly compensated for being textbook DCF correct.
This hints at a further obstacle that analysts face for providing accurate and unbiased price
targets: their incentives simply do not encourage them to do so. Many large financial institutions
which employ equity analysts also oversee an investment banking division. These divisions are
almost always separated by a so-called “Chinese wall,” an informational barrier designed to keep
the material, non-public information (“MNPI”) necessary for investment bankers away from
equity analysts. Similarly, the wall is beneficial for insulating equity analysts from outside
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pressures. To see why, one need only consider a public company deciding which investment
bank to engage for a sale. If the equity research division were to raise its price targets for the firm
in advance of the announcement, it would likely be able to artificially inflate the price paid by
the buyers: and, as a consequence, the fee received by the bank.
Aside from the fact that such informational barriers are rarely perfect (O’Brien,
McNichols, and Lin 2005), they are also subverted by many equity analysts’ compensation
packages (Groysberg, Healy, and Maber 2011). At the bottom of many equity research reports is
a disclaimer stating that the authoring analyst’s compensation is based in part on the revenue of
the entire firm they work for – including the investment banking division. Since investment
bankers often charge a fee based on transaction size, the incentive for analysts to try to inflate
their price targets and create larger deals for their firm is clear. Between the errors made by
analysts in modeling, the incentive misalignments faced by these analysts, and the sheer
difficulty of arriving at an accurate price target notwithstanding these two other factors, it is clear
that the equity research industry’s structure is far from perfect. That being said, its analysts have
access to significant resources, information, and opportunities that many other investors do not
by virtue of covering only a few stocks. The degree to which the latter mitigates the former in
practice is the subject of this paper.
Some authors in the literature have tried to “analyze the analysts,” much as this paper
does. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) find that sell-side analysts generally recommend stocks that are
“positive momentum, high growth, high volume, and relatively expensive” – glamour stocks, as
the authors call them. Hong and Kubik (2003) take a different approach, relating analyst
forecasts to their career paths. The authors find that analysts with more accurate forecasts are
more likely to experience positive career moves, which is to be expected. However, they also
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find that, independent of the effect of accuracy, analysts who are more optimistic tend to
experience more positive career moves (i.e. moving to a higher-status employer). Guttman
(2010) endogenizes the timing of analyst forecast issuances, and finds that analysts whose
private analysis has a higher degree of precision are more likely to issue their forecasts earlier.
While the literature analyzing the circumstances and consequences of analyst forecasts is
somewhat large, this paper distinguishes itself in a few important ways. First, much of the
existing literature focuses on the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts rather than recommendations
– here, I use only recommendation data. Second, the majority of the literature on the subject is
devoted to finding and analyzing factors which are likely to determine analyst forecasts. This
paper reverses the implied predictive relationship and uses analyst recommendations as an input,
rather than an output, to the model to quantify the recommendations’ effect on returns.
Of course, quantifying the benefit that equity analysts provide is difficult without a
tangible comparison point. This paper uses a combination of Bayesian statistics and the portfolio
optimization literature to achieve that goal. Work on the asset allocation problem tends to fall
into economic theory, which focuses on finding the return-generating process for assets and the
assumptions required to arrive at an optimal portfolio, or implementation, which focuses on the
mathematical optimization process.
The most obvious example of the latter is the work of Markowitz (1952), which
established the mean-variance optimization framework for quadratic utility. The fundamental
problem with this model, which the academic community quickly realized, was its sensitivity to
estimation error. While the Markowitz method would produce the optimal portfolio in-sample, it
often gave extreme long and short positions in assets that created undesirable levels of volatility
out-of-sample. DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) explored this volatility issue by
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establishing a “naïve diversification” strategy as the baseline, wherein 1/N of an investor’s
wealth would be invested in each of N assets. The authors compare a number of asset allocation
models with the naïvely diversified portfolio out-of-sample, and show that in many cases the 1/N
strategy actually outperforms rigorous mean-variance allocation models. Interestingly, the
authors showed that for a 25-asset universe, about 3000 months (250 years) of data is required
before a sample-driven optimization algorithm consistently outperforms the naïve diversification.
This is obviously an unrealistic amount of data, particularly if one needs to assume it was all
generated under the same conditions.
In an effort to resolve this consistently observed volatility in portfolio weights, a different
sphere of the literature approaches the problem from a theoretical perspective, introducing factor
models to gain a better understanding of the return-generating processes of various securities.
The economic theory of portfolio allocation as we know it today began with the foundational
work of Sharpe (1963), who established the idea of a factor which drove every stock’s return.
This gave the area such fundamental concepts as betas and market risk premiums, resulting in the
one-factor CAPM often used today. Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1975) then expanded on this,
deriving a unique optimal portfolio of risky assets that is independent of an investor’s wealth
(Merton) or changing risk aversion (Samuelson). Combined, these contributed to the existence of
a unique “tangency portfolio” dependent on the risk-free rate – the optimal set of risky assets to
hold, regardless of an investor’s risk preferences and only assuming a quadratic utility function
!

of the form 𝑈 = 𝐸 [𝑅] − " 𝛾𝜎#" . Subsequently, however, the academic community discovered that
asset returns deviated from the CAPM in predictable ways. The most frequently cited example of
this is Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model, wherein asset returns are dependent on
market returns as well as relationships to a size portfolio and a value portfolio. The desire to
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better explain the cross-section of expected returns has contributed to a surge in the number of
potential factors surveyed, as well as in the way these factors are examined. The more recent
work of MacKinlay and Pástor (1999), for instance, examined the portfolio allocation results in a
market that is aware of all but one factor that influences expected returns. Though the paper
makes some strong assumptions about the nature of observable factors as well as the
idiosyncratic risks of various assets, it is a good example of the way that the factor model was
expanded after William Sharpe’s initial work.
While the portfolio optimization approach takes volatile initial weights as a given and
attempts to mitigate them, the theoretical approach tends to try to quantify the way the market
functions. The natural inclination, then, is to merge these two approaches in search of a model
that takes in market data, but allows it to be altered in controlled ways to avoid the extreme
allocations of Markowitz’s model. It is for this reason that the model of Black and Litterman
(1992) is perhaps a more promising angle to arrive at a portfolio that consistently performs well
out-of-sample. The model takes a quasi-Bayesian approach, starting with the market weights for
various assets and then “tilting” them based on the strength and type of an investor’s beliefs. The
model accounts for absolute beliefs (e.g. “industrials will return 9% this year”) as well as relative
ones (e.g. “consumer staples will outperform consumer discretionary by 2% this year”), making
it highly reflective of the way investors often contemplate their own investment decisions. By
construction, the model produces portfolio weights that are reasonably close to the market
weights, deviating only in ways that directly contribute to the investor’s prior beliefs.
As with most Bayesian models, however, the question then becomes how to source the
prior beliefs and the strengths of these beliefs. Pástor and Stambaugh (2002) used an assetpricing model to generate priors for equity mutual funds, and even with a moderate amount of
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confidence the results show that including a pricing model meaningfully increases the Sharpe
ratio of the resulting portfolios. Bartram and Grinblatt (2018) take a similar approach, using
market replicating portfolios of a given firm’s financial statements to estimate a “peer-implied
fair value” for each security. By finding linear combinations of other publicly traded firms’
financial statements that mirror the target’s financial statements, Bartram and Grinblatt generated
a target price by calculating the actual market price of the linear combination. While these
authors simply use the peer-implied fair values to trade rather than including them in a Bayesian
asset allocation model, their strategy saw significant success. Gillen (2016) adds the technique of
subset optimization to this area, a method which can theoretically be applied to any multi-asset
optimization problem. Rather than calculating the weights of all 𝑁 assets simultaneously, subset
optimization randomly generates 𝑀 portfolios each composed of 𝑛- assets, where 𝑀𝑛- is much
larger than 𝑁. After optimizing within each subset portfolio, the overall portfolio is then
composed of the equally weighted portfolio of all the subsets. Gillen shows that this dominates
both the sample-based optimization algorithm of Markowitz and the 1/N rule examined by
DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009).
In this paper, I combine the conceptual bases of Pástor and Stambaugh (2002) and Black
and Litterman (1992) with both the method of Gillen (2016) and a set of prior beliefs based on
equity analyst expectations. The three benchmark portfolios created provide portfolio weights
based solely on historical return-generating processes with a prior expectation of alpha being
zero, while the experimental portfolios provide updated sets of weights where the prior estimates
of alpha are based on equity analyst predictions. Consequently, a comparison of these portfolios
and their performance will yield a clear picture of the exact ways in which the inclusion of equity
research consensus estimates impacts the portfolio performance.
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Data
I use two databases in the construction of the sample for this paper. Historical stock
return data are from CRSP, and equity analyst recommendation data – including the number,
mean and standard deviation of recommendations – are from Thomson Reuters’ I/B/E/S. A
recommendation in this context is a rating by a single analyst of a single stock, issued as an
integer between 1 and 5 with 1 indicating a “strong buy” stock and 5 indicating a “strong sell”
stock. The I/B/E/S dataset, containing data back through December 1993, is the lower limit of
the sample, with the upper limit being December 2018 I/B/E/S data for a total of 26 years.
However, only each December is used in order to maximize theoretical predictive power for the
following year’s returns. For each year 𝑁 of analyst recommendation data, I take the 11 years
ranging from 𝑁 − 9 to 𝑁 + 1 of stock returns from CRSP. This is why the 2019 I/B/E/S data are
not used – 2020 CRSP data are not yet available as of the writing of this paper. The CRSP data
consist of monthly stock returns for each year, for a total of 132 observations for each stock
which trades for the full 11 years. For stocks which are delisted during the period, the return in
the month of delisting represents the final return observed for that stock.
For a given year, the first ten years of CRSP data are used to calibrate the Bayesian
model and produce estimates of the moments of the data. The final year of CRSP data functions
as the out-of-sample test period. Since many price targets produced by analysts are designated as
12-month price targets, additional out-of-sample years would not relate to the stated goal of
many analysts’ recommendations. The sample consists of the intersection of the CRSP and
I/B/E/S databases (i.e. all stocks which had at least one analyst issuing recommendations) for
each year. The I/B/E/S and CRSP datasets are merged on CUSIP, a unique identifier shared by
both sources. However, some stocks within the I/B/E/S data for various years do not have a
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CUSIP attached to them. These observations are dropped from the sample for that year, but do
not exceed 2% of the sample in any year so it is unlikely these affect the data significantly. Table
1 below shows the number of companies included in the sample for each year.
Table 1: Number of stocks included in out-of-sample period for each year
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
774 924 941 991 1048 1039 1032 986 971 1046 1203 1314 1407
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
1470 1475 1531 1651 1694 1739 1775 1773 1811 1837 1882 1916 1894

Additionally, some stock returns are missing from the CRSP database for a given month;
these returns are replaced with the S&P500 return for the same month, when they fall in the outof-sample period of a given year’s data. After all these adjustments and merges, the final dataset
used for one year of the analysis herein consists of mean (𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐), standard deviation (𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣),
and number of recommendations (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑟𝑒𝑐) for all stocks in a given year, with the ten years of
returns before and one year after (𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷). 26 years sampled in this fashion give
the complete dataset utilized in this paper.
Table 2: Summary statistics for I/B/E/S data from selected
years in sample
meanrec
stdev
numrec
1994 (n = 774)
Mean
2.28
0.63
4.95
Median
2.27
0.71
3
Standard deviation
0.74
0.52
4.19
2006 (n = 1,407)
Mean
2.45
0.70
8.43
Median
2.47
0.79
6
Standard deviation
0.65
0.45
7.42
2019 (n = 1,894)
Mean
2.32
0.67
9.90
Median
2.29
0.74
7
Standard deviation
0.56
0.37
8.31
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A few trends are immediately notable from the basic summary statistics of the data. First,
as is perhaps expected, the number of stocks in the sample generally rises as time goes on. This
is likely due both to an increase in trading activity and the increase in prevalence of analysts over
the period. The latter is also seen clearly in the summary statistics for 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑟𝑒𝑐 – such that the
mean number of recommendations for a given stock in the sample almost exactly doubled from
1994 to 2019. As would be expected, the median value also rose, though it is consistently lower
than the mean. This occurs because, while 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑟𝑒𝑐 has a floor at 1 in the sample, a few bluechip stocks have upwards of 40 analysts covering them in 2019. The summary statistics of
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐 are perhaps the most notable, with means consistently very similar to medians. Two
trends, however, are clear: first, both the mean and median of 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐 are consistently less than
3. This is reflective of a tendency of analysts to preferentially rate stocks as buys over sells. It
does appear irrational that analysts overall expect the average stock to outperform the market
– but this is perhaps to be expected in light of the various incentive misalignments facing equity
analysts, as previously discussed. Furthermore, the standard deviation of 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐 is steadily
dropping over the period, indicating that analysts are increasingly hesitant to issue strong ratings
of 1 (“strong buy”) or, even more likely, 5 (“strong sell”). The summary statistics of 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣 have
a less clear mapping to real-world effects, but it is interesting to note that the standard deviation
of 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣 is declining as well. This is suggestive of the idea that analysts have tended to disagree
with each other in increasingly similar ways on different stocks. Though there is not an
immediately evident real-world explanation for this, it is an interesting trend nonetheless.
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Preliminary Analysis
As a preliminary analytical tool, and to create a more intuitive understanding of the data,
the stocks from a given year were separated into quintiles based on their mean ratings and their
out-of-sample returns were compared. To implement this, a standardized metric 𝑇$,& resembling a
t-statistic was constructed for each stock in each year using the following formula:
𝑇$,& =

𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐$,& − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐
>>>>>>>>>>>>>&
𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣$,&
?𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑟𝑒𝑐$,&

In this construction, 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐$,& represents the mean analyst recommendation for stock 𝑖 in year
𝑡; 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐
>>>>>>>>>>>>>& represents the average mean recommendation over all stocks in year 𝑡; 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣$,&
represents the standard deviation of recommendations for stock 𝑖 in year 𝑡; and 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑟𝑒𝑐$,&
represents the number of recommendations for stock 𝑖 in year 𝑡. In effect, this is a standardized
measure of a stock’s rating relative to the rating for all stocks in the sample for that period. For
some stocks, 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣$,& = 0; this occurs when 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑟𝑒𝑐$,& = 1 or when every covering analyst for
the stock rated it the same. In these cases, the data are winsorized so that the 5th percentile of the
nonzero observations of 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣& is substituted for 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣$,& . This allows a value of 𝑇$,& to be
calculated for these observations, while staying approximately faithful to the true observed
standard deviation of 0.
The stocks for each year are then divided into quintiles based on their values for 𝑇$,& – the
lowest values of 𝑇$,& , and thus the first quintile, corresponding to the stocks most favorably rated
by analysts. Monthly quintile returns for a given year are then calculated as the return on an
equally-weighted portfolio of all assets in the quintile for that month. Repeating this process for
all years in the sample produces a continuous set of monthly returns from 1994 to 2019 for each
quintile, with each year’s returns representing the returns on the stocks rated in that quintile at
15

the end of the prior year. For a given month – without loss of generality, I use April 2019 here as
an illustrative case – I then calculate the year-to-date average of returns. For April 2019, this is
the geometric mean of the returns from January 2019 to April 2019. Since the quintiles for 2019
returns are generated based on December 2018 analyst recommendations, the year-to-date
geometric average monthly return functions as a direct measure of returns over the period the
analyst recommendations are intended to predict. Chart 1 below shows the YTD average return
of each quintile over the entire sample period.

Chart 1: Year-to-date mean monthly returns for each quintile of analyst rating
YTD Mean Monthly Returns by Quintile of Analyst Rating
20%
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0%
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2014

2016
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-5%
-10%
-15%
-20%

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

In the chart above, there appears to be little consistent difference between Q1, the most
favorably rated stocks, and Q5, the least favorably rated stocks. However, to statistically confirm
this, I adopt the null hypothesis that there is no difference between YTD average returns of Q1
and Q5 with the one-sided alternative that Q1 outperforms Q5. Chart 2 below plots the
outperformance of Q1 over Q5, with the dotted orange line representing the average
outperformance over the sample period.
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Chart 2: Year-to-date mean monthly outperformance of most positively-rated quintile over most
negatively-rated quintile
YTD Mean Outperformance: Q1 over Q5
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The initial appearance of no significant difference between Q1 and Q5 is confirmed by a
difference in means test – on average, Q1 outperforms Q5 by just 1.3 bps (9.2 bps) per month,
giving a t-score of 0.14 which is insufficient to reject the null at any conventional level. One
complicating factor is the few extreme values observed, for instance in the first month of 2008
when Q1 outperforms Q5 by more than 1,000 bps. Most of the extreme values visible in the chart
are due to the nature of YTD averaging. In the earliest months of a given year, there are fewer
months of returns contributing to the average – as such, the YTD average will have an unusually
high standard error, indeed equaling the volatility of a single month’s returns in the first month.
By December, however, volatility in any one month is unlikely to affect the average excessively.
One way to mitigate this is to consider the same test above, but with YTD averages from the first
quarter of the year removed. Over this sample, Q1 actually underperforms Q5 by an average of
4.4 bps (6.6 bps). While the removal of means from the first quarter is effective in lowering
volatility by 28%, the results still yield a t-score of -0.67 – again not significant at any
conventional level. Additional tests on removing the second and third quarters are shown in
Table 3 below.
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Table 3: Effects of removing first n quarters of returns on
statistical significance of top-quintile outperformance over
bottom quintile
Test
Mean
Standard error
T-score
All Quarters
1.3 bps
9.2 bps
0.14
Included
First 1 Quarter
-4.4 bps
6.6 bps
-0.67
Removed
First 2 Quarters
-6.4 bps
6.9 bps
-0.92
Removed
First 3 Quarters
-8.6 bps
8.6 bps
-1.00
Removed

It is clear from the table above that removing additional quarters beyond the first is not
effective; indeed, it actually increases the standard error due to the substantial decrease in sample
size that removing these additional quarters causes. These results suggest that the most favorably
rated stocks do not significantly outperform even the least favorably rated stocks in the year after
they are rated; put simply, they imply that analyst ratings are not a reliable predictor of returns in
the 12 months after the ratings are given.
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Method
Beginning from the merged CRSP-IBES dataset discussed above, the method of analysis I
conduct here can be summarized in four steps. First, the prior estimates of alpha for each stock
are generated. Second, Fama and French’s factor data are imported and each stock’s returns are
regressed on these variables, which are then used in the standard Bayesian process to obtain the
posterior expectations and variances of returns for each security. Third, the process of subset
optimization discussed by Gillen (2016) is used to generate the optimal portfolio weights for
each period. Finally, these weights are applied to the out-of-sample return periods to build the
out-of-sample performance. Each of these steps is discussed in detail below.
The prior estimates of 𝐸(𝛼) are generated on a linear scale based on each stock’s mean
recommendation in comparison to the average mean recommendation across all assets for the
period. The stock with the value of 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐 which is furthest from >>>>>>>>>>>>
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐 over the period
will be assigned the greatest magnitude of 𝛼. Specifically, the estimate for stock 𝑖 is generated
with the following formula:
𝐸'($)( (𝛼$ ) = −

1
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐$,&-! − >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐&-!
∗ 𝛼*+, ∗
12
max(|𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐&-! − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
&-! |)

𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐$,& is the same variable discussed previously, representing the mean analyst
recommendation for stock 𝑖 at time 𝑡; 𝛼*+, represents the maximum value I allow the prior
estimate of annual alpha to take. The selection of 𝛼*+, varies in the model based on the
confidence I place in the analyst estimates; values of 0%, 1%, 5%, and 10% are used here. The
scaling factor of −1/12 converts this figure to a monthly parameter to match with the monthly
stock returns used in the data, and the negative sign accounts for the fact that a 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐 of 1
corresponds to a strong buy, and therefore should have positive alpha. It should be noted here
that, since >>>>>>>>>>>>
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐 is typically less than 3, the stocks with the largest magnitude of alpha will
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typically be those rated as strong sells, with consequently large negative alpha. The prior
estimate for the standard deviation of alpha is generated in a similar way:
𝜎'($)( M𝛼$,& N =

1
𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣$,&-!
∗ 𝛼*+, ∗
+ 𝜎.
12
max(|𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐&-! − >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐&-! |)

As in the typical Bayesian formulation, the first term of this expression corresponds to the
standard deviation of the recommendations for stock 𝑖, scaled by the same factor used above.
Though this is a standard deviation and not a variance, the scale of 1/12 is still appropriate since
its only purpose is to scale 𝛼*+, to a monthly level. The second term, 𝜎. , is a parameter set in
the model, and represents the expected value of the standard deviation of 𝛼 independent of the
variance in expectation calculated in the first term. Values for 𝜎. of 0.0001%, 1%, and 100% are
used in this paper, and each corresponds to a distinct model which will be discussed in more
detail later.
After generating the priors, the next step is to bring in the Fama and French data. This
paper uses six of the Fama-French factors: market performance, size, value, momentum, shortterm reversal, and long-term reversal. I first convert the sample returns to excess returns by
subtracting the risk-free rate for the corresponding period, then regress these excess returns on
the benchmarks to pull the residuals. The mean squared residual across all assets and all time
periods within the in-sample period is then used to scale the prior variance. I then use the
standard Bayesian shrinkage process to arrive at the posterior expected returns and variances for
each security.
The following step is to use these posterior expected returns and variances as inputs into
the subset optimization process of Gillen (2016). I employ two constraints – the “full
investment” constraint that portfolio weights must sum to one, and the “no short-selling”
constraint that no portfolio weights can be less than zero. A corollary of these rules is that the
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portfolio may not be more than 100% invested in any asset. I use the standard quadratic utility
formulation of investor preferences, where 𝑈 = 𝐸(𝑅) − 0.5𝛾𝜎#" . 𝛾, representing the investor’s
risk aversion coefficient, is set to 4 for this paper. I take 1000 subset portfolios, each with 50
stocks. Each subset portfolio is generated with a random selection of 50 stocks (with
replacement), and the subset is then optimized using quadratic utility. After the formulation of all
subset portfolios is complete, the overall optimal portfolio is composed of the equally-weighted
portfolio of these subsets. Once the optimal portfolio weights are calculated, it is fairly simple to
test the portfolio on the out-of-sample returns. However, note that each out-of-sample period is
only one year. This entire process, then, is conducted 26 times – one for each sample period
– which results in an optimal portfolio that is rebalanced each year. For the purposes of this
paper, the transaction costs of rebalancing a portfolio which may contain nearly 2000 assets are
not accounted for.

21

Results
In the preliminary analysis, it was shown that no significant difference existed between
the return on the top analyst-rated quintile of stocks and the bottom analyst-rated quintile.
Consequently, both the hypothesis and that analysis suggest that the portfolio allocation
approach is unlikely to yield any significant difference between portfolios which take analyst
expectations into account and portfolios which do not. To test this, I analyze six portfolio
construction strategies which vary in their values of 𝛼*+, and 𝜎. :
1) CAPM: 𝜶𝒎𝒂𝒙 = 𝟎%, 𝝈𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏%
The first model I construct is the standard six-factor CAPM, with a maximum prior
expectation for alpha of 0% and an arbitrarily small prior standard deviation of alpha. This
produces an allocation strategy which assumes the six factors considered – market, size, value,
momentum, short-term reversal, and long-term reversal – explain the systematic returngenerating process completely and alpha does not exist. Note that setting 𝜎. = 0 would lead to
perfect singularity in the matrices used to execute the Bayesian shrinkage process, and I
therefore use the arbitrarily small 0.0001% instead to ensure the extremely high precision of this
estimate causes it to dominate any alpha seen in the data when the posterior estimate is
calculated. The standard CAPM serves as one of the three benchmark models used.
2) Bayesian CAPM: 𝜶𝒎𝒂𝒙 = 𝟎%, 𝝈𝜶 = 𝟏%
The second model considered is a Bayesian model of the six-factor CAPM, with a
maximum prior expectation for alpha of 0% and a prior standard deviation of 1%. While this is
still an uninformed prior expectation like model (1), it allows for some alpha to be introduced
from the data. Stocks that appear to generate alpha over the training period will be more strongly

22

weighted in this model than in model (1). The Bayesian CAPM serves as the second of the three
benchmarks used.
3) Agnostic Bayesian CAPM: 𝜶𝒎𝒂𝒙 = 𝟎%, 𝝈𝜶 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎%
The third model considered is another Bayesian model, with a maximum prior
expectation for alpha of 0% but an arbitrarily large standard deviation. The effect this produces is
that, because the precision of the prior estimate of alpha is so low, any small amount of alpha
seen in the data will dominate the prior expectation in the posterior estimate. Consequently,
while model (1) assumes the investor is confident alpha cannot be generated, and model (2)
assumes the investor believes alpha cannot be generated but could learn otherwise from the data,
model (3) effectively assumes the investor knows nothing at all about alpha before incorporating
the data. Because of this juxtaposition of three benchmark models, we are able to clearly see
whether any kind of investor would be able to benefit from incorporating analyst
recommendations: independently of their beliefs about alpha.
4) Analyst 1%: 𝜶𝒎𝒂𝒙 = 𝟏%, 𝝈𝜶 = 𝟏%
The fourth model considered is the first one which incorporates analyst expectations,
with a maximum prior expectation of alpha of 1% and a standard deviation of 1%. Using the
process discussed earlier, this model standardizes the prior belief for alpha on the interval
[−1%, 1%], with the highest-rated stocks receiving positive alpha and the lowest-rated stocks
receiving negative alpha. While this model (like the next two which also incorporate analyst
expectations) allows for shrinkage based on the data, it creates shrinkage towards a different
value.
5) Analyst 5%: 𝜶𝒎𝒂𝒙 = 𝟓%, 𝝈𝜶 = 𝟏%
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The fifth model considered is exactly the same as the fourth, but with a broader interval
for the prior estimate of alpha to fall in – namely the interval [−5%, 5%]. By using the same
standard deviation with a larger range, this model produces an effect of greater confidence in the
analysts’ recommendations as a predictor of returns. Because the precision of the estimate
remains the same, values of alpha in this model will be more extreme than those in model (4).
6) Analyst 10%: 𝜶𝒎𝒂𝒙 = 𝟏𝟎%, 𝝈𝜶 = 𝟏%
The sixth and final model is the same as models (4) and (5), with an even larger interval
of possible alpha priors: [−10%, 10%]. Since this model again has the same standard deviation
as models (4) and (5), it only produces a greater spread of the posterior alpha results without
decreasing the precision of the prior. It is also worth noting that 10% was the largest value of
𝛼*+, used because it is unlikely any investor would consistently expect more than 10%, or less
than -10%, annual alpha from a single stock. The summary statistics of the excess returns of the
six portfolios generated by these models are in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Summary statistics of portfolio performance under each of six sets of model
specifications
Model
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Parameters
𝜶𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝝈𝜶
Summary Statistics
Mean
Standard deviation
Annualized mean
Annualized SD
Sharpe ratio

(6)

CAPM

Bayesian
CAPM

Agnostic
Bayesian
CAPM

0%
0.0001%

0%
1%

0%
100%

1%
1%

5%
1%

10%
1%

0.92%
4.80%
10.99%
16.63%
0.661

0.90%
4.75%
10.74%
16.45%
0.653

0.85%
5.40%
10.20%
18.70%
0.545

0.90%
4.74%
10.78%
16.40%
0.657

0.90%
4.71%
10.83%
16.30%
0.664

0.92%
4.70%
11.05%
16.29%
0.678

Analyst
1%

Analyst
5%

Analyst
10%
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With the exception of model (3), the agnostic Bayesian CAPM, all the models appear to
have almost identical Sharpe ratios. This is driven by largely similar means and standard
deviations, except for model (3) which has a notably higher standard deviation of returns. A
formal set of tests on the monthly outperformance of each model over the three benchmarks
confirms this initial impression, the results of which are shown in Table 5 below.
Table 5: Outperformance statistics of three analyst models over three benchmark models
Model
(4)
(5)
(6)
Analyst 1% Analyst 5% Analyst 10%
Model (1): CAPM
Mean outperformance
-1.8 bps
-1.4 bps
0.4 bps
Standard error
2.7 bps
3.1 bps
3.8 bps
T-Score
-0.66
-0.44
0.11
Model (2): Bayesian CAPM
Mean outperformance
0.3 bps
0.7 bps
2.6 bps
Standard error
0.7 bps
1.5 bps
2.5 bps
T-Score
0.47
0.49
1.03
Model (3): Agnostic Bayesian CAPM
Mean outperformance
4.8 bps
5.2 bps
7.1 bps
Standard error
8.6 bps
8.5 bps
8.4 bps
T-Score
0.56
0.62
0.84

Clearly, none of these findings are sufficient to reject any null hypothesis that models (4),
(5), or (6) do not outperform the benchmark models (1), (2), or (3) at any conventional level of
significance. As was expected from the preliminary analysis, there is no evidence here to suggest
that incorporating analyst recommendations into the portfolio allocation process has any positive
effect on expected return. We can also examine the return-generating processes of each of the six
portfolios, listed below in Table 6.
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Table 6: Return-generating processes for each of the six model specifications tested
Model
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Alpha
𝜷𝟏 : Market
𝜷𝟐 : SMB
𝜷𝟑 : HML
𝜷𝟒 : MOM
𝜷𝟓 : ST Rev.
𝜷𝟔 : LT Rev.

CAPM
0.21%
(0.06%)
0.96
(0.01)
0.39
(0.02)
0.30
(0.02)
-0.10
(0.01)
0.04
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)

Bayesian
CAPM
0.20%
(0.06%)
0.96
(0.02)
0.38
(0.02)
0.21
(0.02)
-0.07
(0.01)
0.04
(0.01)
0.01
(0.02)

Agnostic
Bayesian
CAPM
0.15%
(0.08%)
1.04
(0.02)
0.45
(0.02)
-0.12
(0.03)
-0.08
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
0.05
(0.03)

Analyst
1%
0.21%
(0.06%)
0.96
(0.02)
0.39
(0.02)
0.21
(0.02)
-0.07
(0.01)
0.04
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)

Analyst
5%
0.22%
(0.06%)
0.94
(0.02)
0.41
(0.02)
0.20
(0.02)
-0.07
(0.01)
0.05
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)

(6)
Analyst
10%
0.25%
(0.06%)
0.92
(0.01)
0.44
(0.02)
0.19
(0.02)
-0.07
(0.01)
0.05
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)

Unsurprisingly, no large difference exists between the alpha estimates of the six sets of
specifications. The coefficients on the various Fama-French factors vary slightly from one set of
specifications to the next, but there is no significant change between the benchmark portfolios
and the analyst-based portfolios.
To confirm the completeness of the six sets of specifications used, a series of robustness
checks are employed. The first consists of a seventh set of specifications, where 𝛼*+, = 10%
and 𝜎. = 10% – effectively a combination of the agnosticism from model (3) and the high
degree of analyst confidence from model (6). This model produces results almost identical to the
results of model (3), with a mean excess monthly return exactly equal to that of model (3) and a
standard error just 3 bps lower. Consequently, like model (3), this additional model has a lower
Sharpe ratio than both the other two benchmarks and the three analyst-based models: though
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neither causes statistically significant outperformance. This suggests, albeit not decisively due to
the lack of significance, that the agnostic approach (using high 𝜎. ) produces unfavorable results
independent of the value of 𝛼*+, . This is perhaps to be expected since such an approach, with a
low precision for the prior estimate, negates the benefit of using Bayesian regression.
Two additional robustness checks involve using a value of 𝛾, the risk aversion
coefficient, of 1 instead of 4; as well as using 100-stock subset portfolios instead of 50-stock
portfolios for the subset optimization. The first, which represents the investor being more willing
to take on risk, succeeds in increasing volatility – however, it too fails to increase expected
returns and therefore yields an even lower Sharpe ratio than any of the benchmarks. The second
similarly yields no significant change in the results, indicating that the initially selected value of
𝑛- = 50 creates sufficient diversification within the subsets. While these three checks are not a
complete assessment of the possible variations to the model specifications, they each alter a
primary input to the portfolios – 𝜎. , 𝛾, and 𝑛- – and the lack of significant differences suggests
the six sets of specifications used are sufficient to address the question.
One final check I employ is to shorten the sample period to the 17 years from 2003-2019.
After the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, a number of protections were implemented
in an attempt to ensure the separation of the investment banking and equity research practices
within a financial institution. Therefore, it is possible that the performance of the analyst-based
portfolios would improve after 2002 in light of their new incentive structure. Although the
analyst-based portfolios do improve, with an average increase in Sharpe ratio of 0.042, the
benchmark portfolios see an even greater average increase in Sharpe ratio of 0.057. The result is
that, despite the increase in Sharpe ratio for the analyst-based portfolios, they still fail to
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outperform the benchmarks. Despite the other effects Sarbanes-Oxley had on the equity research
industry, I do not find evidence it significantly altered the industry’s collective outperformance.
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Conclusion
The hypothesis I investigate is that portfolios based on analyst recommendations do not
significantly outperform portfolios not based on those recommendations. To evaluate this
hypothesis, I use monthly stock return data from CRSP and analyst recommendation data from
I/B/E/S to create analysis for the 26 years from 1994 to 2019. With this data, I employ two
different methods to test the hypothesis. The first, and more simplistic, method consists of
separating all stocks rated in a given year into quintiles based on their mean recommendation and
then evaluating the performance of the equally-weighted portfolios within each quintile. The
second analytical method employs a Bayesian regression model in which analyst
recommendation data is used to generate the prior estimate for alpha, and mean-variance utilitymaximizing portfolios are then constructed under different sets of specifications for the
confidence in analyst recommendations. In both the preliminary analysis and the primary
analysis, the results fail to reject the null hypothesis, since neither analysis provided evidence of
statistically significantly different performance between either the quintiles or the portfolios.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts do not contribute significant
value to a portfolio allocation model. It is worth noting one primary assumption made in this
paper, on which further research would almost certainly be productive, is that analysts are a
homogeneous group. That is, the analysis herein does not distinguish between those at highstatus investment banks and those at less credible institutions. Additionally, this paper does not
consider stocks which simply do not receive an analyst rating, since these are not contained in
the I/B/E/S database. It could be valuable to investigate whether some analysts tend to be more
correct than others, as well as how a portfolio composed of “unrated” stocks performs relative to
the portfolios assessed here. As this paper stands, however, it suggests more research is needed
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as to whether equity analysts are truly able to generate an edge. Equity research is a
multimillion-dollar enterprise for many investment banks – financed by all manner of
institutional investors – but my results suggest that investors may not be any better off because of
it.
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